The Government

The Chancellors

Amory and Lloyd were both relatively weak Chancellors who spent much of their time at the Treasury doing the Prime Minister’s bidding. As a young MP for Stockton in the 1920s, Macmillan was acutely aware of the distress caused by unemployment and for this reason he always encouraged his Chancellors to adopt expansionary policies.

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Amory was a reluctant Chancellor who delivered the traditional pre-election boost to the economy in 1959 before reclaiming some of the tax cuts after victory had been achieved. Although aware of the UK’s underlying problems of trade performance, the exchange rate and the balance of payments, Amory was not a politician to rock the boat and left the Treasury at a time of his own choosing.

Selwyn Lloyd had a much bumpier ride as some of the chickens came home to roost. As the external account deteriorated, there was pressure on the (then fixed) exchange rate and the UK’s gold and currency reserves.

Deflation was called for but Lloyd added a new twist, a ‘pay pause’. It was in effect an incomes policy for the public sector but the idea of nurses picking up the tab for economic mismanagement exacted a high political price.

It cost Lloyd his job but not before he had set up the National Economic Development Council, a tripartite body of government, management and unions to look at longer-term issues of the economy’s performance.

For much of Maudling’s tenure at the Treasury, Sir Alec Douglas Home, a self-confessed economic illiterate, was Prime Minister. Maudling had the necessary credentials to be Chancellor and had more independence than his predecessors. His approach was novel and high risk, usually referred to as ‘a dash for growth’.

With unemployment rising and an election looming, the Chancellor loosened policy. The improbable rationale for the ‘dash for growth’ was that faster growth was the answer to inflation and, by reducing unit costs, it was the key to successful exporting and the traditional balance of payments constraint.

Whether it was the result of bad advice, political expediency or wishful thinking is not clear, but it was apparent that, by the end of 1963, output was growing at a faster rate than could possibly be sustained. The Labour opposition could hardly complain because it had attacked Maudling for being too cautious. The policy, nevertheless, almost helped the Conservatives to an unlikely electoral victory in October 1964 and ensured that the incoming Labour government would be faced with serious difficulties from the start.